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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Retail Credit: The Time Price Differential and Revolving Credit
Carrying Charges-Installment sales transactions have become a
most significant element in today's retail merchandising operation.
Quite naturally, recent legal developments in this area have attracted
the attention as well as occasioned the concern of the retail business
community. In particular, considerable interest has been generated by
the recent series of decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court touching
upon the time price differential concept.'
The time price differential is simply the amount by which the time
price of a particular item, the price at which a vendor will consent to
sell it on credit, exceeds the price at which he would be willing to sell
the identical item in return for immediate cash payment. The traditional
view originating in the English case Beete v. Bidgood2 and adopted by
the United States Supreme Court in Hogg v. Ruffner3 is that a seller
enjoys complete freedom to set one price for a cash sale and a second
and higher price in the case of a sale involving deferred payments.
The difference between the two prices constitutes compensation to
the seller for the increased risk and expense involved in the credit
transaction. It does not constitute interest, and consequently is not
subject to the impact of the usury laws. "To constitute usury, there
must be a loan and a taking of usurious interest, or the taking of more
than legal interest for the forbearance of a debt or sum of money due."4
A genuine conditional sale upon a deferred payment basis involves
neither a loan nor the forbearance of a debt. 5
Through the years this same attitude has been reflected in a multi-
tude of state court decisions. Among the most recent opinions express-
ing the traditional viewpoint is that of the Minnesota Supreme Court
in Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc. which held that "a bona fide in-
stallment sale does not come within the purview of the usury statute."6
The Supreme Court of Missouri held in Wyatt v. Commercial Credit
Corporation that finance charges added to the cash price of a refrigerator
purchased on an installment plan do not constitute interest.7 Within the
past year two other courts" have considered the installment sale, and
have similarly decided that the transaction does not involve a loan or
the forbearance of a debt and that the carrying charge, finance charge, or
time price differential does not constitute interest.
I Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W. 2d 528 (1963) ; Stanton v. Mattson,
175 Neb. 767, 123 N.W. 2d 844 (1963); and Lloyd v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775,
124 N.W. 2d 198 (1963).2fBeete v. Bidgood, 7 B.&C. 453, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827).
3 Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. 115 (1861).
4Id. at 118.
5Dunn v. Midland Loan Finance Corp., 206 Minn. 550, 289 N.W. 411 (1939).
6 Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 93 N.W. 2d 690, 694 (1958).
7Wyatt v. Commercial Credit Corporation, 341 S.W. 2d 348 (Mo. 1960).
8 Lamb v. Ed Maher Inc., 368 S.W. 2d 255 (Tex. Civ. .App. 1963) and Carolina
Industrial Bank v. Merriman, 260 N.C. 336, 132 S.E. 2d 692 (1963).
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The Nebraska Supreme Court in Lloyd v. Gutgsell9 dealt with an
apparently similar installment sales agreement but came to an alto-
gether contrary determination. The trial court had entered judgment in
favor of the purchaser of a house trailer who had brought suit to can-
cel a conditional sales contract and a promissory note, to recover pay-
ments made, and to secure a certificate of title to the trailer without
encumbrance. The majority of the court, with two justices concurring,
affirmed the decision of the trial court, finding the transaction to be
usurious. The cash price of the trailer was $5,000.00 which was reduced
by a cash down payment and a trade-in allowance, leaving an unpaid
balance of cash price in the amount of $3750.00. The conditional sales
agreement specified a time price differential of $1229.00 and insurance
charges of $340.00. The time price of the trailer under the contract was
$6,569.00.1°
The majority opinion, in holding the challenged contract to be usuri-
ous, did not technically reject the traditional view that a true install-
ment sale does not involve the charging of interest. The court did in
fact carry out a previous determination "to look through the form and
examine the substance" of any agreement in order to determine "whether
such a transaction is a time sale made in good faith or a loan.""
The deciding factor in the supreme court's determination that the
transaction was in essence a loan was the undisputed testimony of the
purchasers concerning their conversation with the salesman. The testi-
mony indicated that a time price was never discussed with or even men-
tioned to the purchaser prior to the signing of the contract. The pur-
chaser was given no choice between a cash and a credit price. Another
factor considered by the court was that the contract form had itself been
prepared by the finance company and contained a printed assignment
to the company.1 The court concluded that the transaction was "merely
a sale for a cash price, with the difference between the money the buyer
has and what he needs being financed."' 3 The court felt that "the ex-
pectation was that the defendant would finance the transaction and ad-
vance the balance of the cash price to the seller."' 4 The time price
differential was considered merely the charge for this advance and hence
was interest. Since the amount of the differential exceeded nine per
cent, simple interest, the transaction was held to be an usurious one.
The majority opinions seems to indicate that a bona fide time sale
would still escape the impact of the usury law. Justices Boslaugh and
Brower in their separate concurring opinions, however, disclose the
9 Lloyd v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W. 2d 198 (1963).20 Id., 124 N.W. 2d at 201.
". State ex. rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 168 Neb. 298, 96 N.W. 2d
55 (1959).
12 Lloyd v. Gutgsell, supra note 9, 124 N.W. 2d at 203.
3 Id., 124 N.W. 2d at 204.
14 Id., 124 N.W. 2d at 203.
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belief that the court's decision marks an absolute departure from the
established view on the nature of the time price differential. Both jus-
tices were particularly disturbed by the fact that the decision was not
made prospective in effect to safeguard the validity of numerous finan-
cial transactions which had been consummated in reliance upon the past
decisions of the court.1
5
Justice Boslaugh believes that "the effect of the language of the
majority opinion is to destroy the validity of all time sales contracts
which were made in good faith upon previous decisions of this court."1 6
Justice Brower interprets the present decision as creating "a new rule
of law in conflict with our previous holdings. ' 17 He evidently feels that
the effect of the decision is to equate completely a time price differential
with an interest charge. In addition, he clearly believes that the tra-
ditional distinction is an artificial one which disregards the facts of
modem economic life. Justice Brower adopts a view similar to that
advocated by some commentators that the position of an installment
purchaser under a contract, whether or not assigned to a finance com-
pany, is not significantly different from that of the borrower who se-
cures a loan from a finance company to purchase the identical item.
Under current conditions the buyer has no greater freedom than the
borrower. The effect of competition controls the installment seller to no
greater extent than the lender who is in addition subject to the usury
laws. It is in short the belief of Justice Brower that today the time
price differential is "interest received for forbearance of the dealer to
collect the cash price and that the same law of usury should be applied
to the time differential as to interest on a loan."' 8
If the Nebraska Supreme Court is not formulating a complete re-
jection of the established time price differential concept, but is merely
looking through the form of the transaction to discover its real nature,
the decision in Lloyd v. Gutgsell is not altogether novel nor unique. The
judicial history of the installment sale and of the usurious bargain is
replete with similar admonitions.19 During the past two decades, many
courts have shown an inclination to disregard the form of the transac-
tion and strike down as usurious contracts which purported to be ordi-
nary installment sales agreements. The Minnesota Supreme Court led
the way in Seebold v. Eusterman, acknowledging the traditional install-
ment sales theory but holding the challenged contract a mere subter-
fuge to conceal a loan." The Michigan Supreme Court in Hillman's v.
Em 'N Al's held an installment agreement for the sale of restaurant
equipment usurious, but adhered to the view that "unless the sale and
15 Id., 124 N.W. 2d at 204-206.
16 Id., 124 N.W. 2d at 205.
17 Id., 124 N.W. 2d at 206.
is Ibid.
19 Randall v. Home Loan & Investment Co., 244 Wis. 623, 12 N.W. 2d 915 (1944).
20 Seebold v. Eusterman, 216 Minn. 566, 13 N.W. 2d 739 (1944).
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purchase of property is a mere pretense the seller may charge a greater
price for goods bought on credit than for cash without rendering the
transaction usurious."21 In the recent case of Elder v. Doerr, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court itself professed to adhere to the traditional view
of the installment sale. The court also held, however, that a "transaction
is not a valid time sale made in good faith unless the seller informs the
buyer, at the time of the sale, of the cash and time prices and gives the
buyer the opportunity to choose the one he will accept.122
Other courts have struck down conditional sales agreements for the
same reasons which disturbed the Nebraska Supreme Court. In G.F.C.
Corporation v. Williams, the court emphasized the absence of any price
other than the cash sales price on the basis of which a finance charge
was computed.2 3 In Bradford v. Mack, the same court again failed to
find a genuine time sale because only a cash price had been quoted to
the purchaser.2 4 In Daniel v. First National Bank of Birminghanz 5 and
in Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corporation,26 the courts pointed
to the excessive involvement of the bank and finance company in the
transaction as an indication that the questionable transaction was in
essence a loan. Only the Arkansas Supreme Court in Sloan v. Sears
Roebuck & Co.27 has adopted the position apparently taken by the con-
curring opinions in Lloyd v. Gutgsell, that all time price differentials
are interest charges and will be held usurious if in excess of the legal
interest rates.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has not as yet been called upon
to consider the applicability of the usury laws t6 installment sales agree-
ments. In 1935, however, the time price differentials did receive a
measure of statutory recognition under the Motor Vehicle Installment
Sales Act which provided for licensing by the State Banking Depart-
ment and prohibited "unconscionable" charges s In 1953 the Act was
amended to establish maximum rates of charges for each of several
categories of motor vehicles. At the same time the Banking Department
was given power to make rules and regulations and to examine the
records of licensees.2 9
In 1959, a bill prepared by the Wisconsin Retail Merchants Associ-
ation was introduced into the state senate.3 0 One purpose of this bill
was to extend statutory recognition of the time price differential to
include retail sales of items other than automobiles. The bill provided
21 Hillman's v. Em 'N Al's, 345 Mich. 644, 77 N.W. 2d 96 (1956).
22 Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W. 2d 528, 533 (1963).
2sG.F.C. Corporation v. Williams, 231 S.W. 2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
24Bradford v. Mack, 359 S.W. 2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
25 Daniel v. First National Bank of Birmingham, 227 F. 2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955).
26 Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W. 2d 973 (1952).
27Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464,308 S.W. 2d 802 (1957).
28 Wis. Laws 1935, ch. 474; Wis. STAT. §218.01 (1935).
29 Wis. Laws 1953, ch. 302, §§1-4.
30 Bill No. 256, S., Wis. Legis. (1959).
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for full disclosure of terms to the buyer and a differential not to exceed
$12 per $100 of principal balance per year. An amended version of
this bill3 1 was passed by the legislature but was vetoed by the governor
on October 28, 1959. Among the reasons specified in the veto message,
the governor emphasized the absence of provisions for licensing and
supervision of installment sales corresponding to those already govern-
ing small loans and automobile financing.
By means of this same bill an attempt was made to solve another
retail credit problem, the validity of the revolving credit or budget
charge account. The revolving account functions like the standard
charge account, but payments may be spread out over a period of
several months. The plans have several variations including fixed
monthly payments and limitations on credit. The store applies a carry-
ing or service charge to the unpaid balance at the end of the month. The
usual charge among Wisconsin department stores is 12 percent per
month which amounts to an annual rate of 18 per cent. Retail mer-
chants have attempted to cloak these charges in time price terminology,
but it is difficult to conceive of them as anything but interest for the
forbearance of existing debts. The charge is computed as a percentage
of the unpaid balance, and no attempt is made to set individual time
prices for each item. It would seem that a revolving credit charge ex-
ceeding 10 percent per annum is in violation of the small loan law3 2 and
that the debt is uncollectable. The bill vetoed by the governor because
of the failure to provide for licensing and supervision would have legal-
ized revolving credit charges of up to 12 percent per month.
Another attempt to solve these credit problems was made in the
state assembly in 1959 by means of two separate bills which attacked
the problems on an individual basis.3 3 Both bills were indefinitely post-
poned. Versions of these bills are currently being held in the assembly
committee on Insurance and Banking for disposal in the April ses-
sion, 1964. One bill would authorize monthly revolving credit charges
not to exceed 1 Y2 percent on balances up to $300. A monthly charge
of 1 percent would be allowed on that part of the balance in excess of
$300. 34 The companion bill extends the statutory time price differential
to apply to the sales of goods other than automobiles, the allowed rate
varying with the size of the principal balance.35 In addition both bills
provide for licensing and supervision.36
The possible effect of the much publicized decision of the Nebraska
Supreme Court in Lloyd v. Gutgsell upon Wisconsin judicial thought
31 Substitute Amendment No. 1, S., to Bill No. 256, S., Wis. Legis. (1959).
32 WIs. STAT. §214.22 (1961).
33 Bills No. 828, A., and 829, A., Wis. Legis. (1959).
3 Bill No. 796, A., Wis. Legis. (1959).
35 Bill No. 795, A., Wis. Legis. (1963).
36 Bill No. 171, S., Wis. Legis. (1963), which has been killed in the-state senate,
dealt with both revolving credit charges and the time price differential.
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is a matter of speculation, but it is clear that this decision has served
to re-emphasize the need for statutory clarification and stabilization of
the retail credit picture. In light of the recent decisions of the Ne-
braska Supreme Court, it is obvious that such legislative action cannot
fail to benefit the retail seller as well as the installment purchaser.
MICHAEL S. NOLAN
Legal Ethics: Attorney Disciplined for Unprofessional Conduct
-Defendant-attorney was found guilty of unprofessional conduct in
an action instigated upon complaint of the Board of State Bar Com-
missioners. This finding was based upon two grounds. The first related
to the maintenance of a neon "Income Tax" sign in the defendant's
window, and the second concerned the allowance in his office of an
income tax service conducted by his wife, a nonprofessional. Noting
that this was a "test" case involving somewhat common practices, the
court merely reprimanded the defendant and ordered him to pay costs
not to exceed $200.'
In its opinion the court pointed out that the placement of the "In-
come Tax" sign called attention to the defendant's law office as the
place where such service could be obtained. This, it felt, was a form
of advertising, which amounted to solicitation of business, thus being
unprofessional conduct. The court rejected defendant's argument that
because nonprofessionals are permitted to engage in such service, his
performance, within narrow, nonlegal limits, was engagement in a
business in which he was free to advertise. The court concluded that the
public interest would not be best served by allowing advertisement on
the part of attorneys who render tax services.
The court looked at the problem of office sharing as a permissive
practice, but only in certain instances. In the Willenson case the court
held that the arrangement amounted to unprofessional conduct. There
must be evidence of a physical separation which indicates the inde-
pendence of the parties such that patrons of the other enterprise will
be apprised of the lack of supervisory control by the attorney.
The refusal of the defendant-attorney to remove the sign upon re-
quest subjected him to possible disbarment or a substantial period of
suspension. However, it is questionable whether the court would have
imposed such stringent sanctions even absent the nature of the case as
a "test" case.
An attorney may be disciplined for actions that contravene
the ethics of his profession even though his conduct is neither
criminal nor calculated to obstruct justice .... It has also been
said that unprofessional conduct that will justify disbarment
1 State v. Willenson, 20 Wis. 2d 519, 123 N.W. 2d 452 (1963).
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